The editor of the Review of International Organizations, Axel Dreher, sent me a link to the the most recent issue of the journal. While I had not heard of it before, it seems quite interesting. In particular, the forthcoming article by Peter Bernholz titled "Are international organizations like the Bank for International Settlements unable to die?" seems quite nice. From its abstract:

International Organizations seem to be immortal or at least long-lived. In this paper several factors which may be responsible for this fact are put forward and then analyzed by studying the empirical case of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which has now survived for seventy-eight years all threats to its existence. This is the more surprising since it was heavily attacked by the government of the most powerful country of the world, the USA for some years. This country demanded the dissolution of the BIS at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 as a precondition for allowing nations to join the planned International Monetary Fund. Before this the Bank was also able to master the crisis resulting from the demise of the gold (exchange) standard and the end of the German reparation payments agreed on in the Dawes and Young Plans, both consequences of the Great Depression.

It seems to me that most public choice scholars would find this paper of interest.
An underexplored area of economics for public choicers is the political economy of international organizations (although The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach by Vaubel and Willett is great and Dreher himself does nice work as well).